An Examination of Professor Bergsons Philosophy

nd to mark the phases of its development. The first chapter, on Time and Free Will, is republished from Mind by the kind per mission of the Editor. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. TIME AND FREE WILL PAGES THE Two FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, CON CRETE TIME OR DURATION, AND ACTION THE DESTINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS . . 3, 4 DURATION 5-10 Illustrations leave suspicion that principle is pushed too far, 5-8 superficial states and deep-seated states, and a dualism of two selves, 9, 10. SPACE, HOMOGENEOUS TIME, AND NUMBER . 10-22 Kant on space, 10 oscillation between external reality and mental concept, 10-12 reduction of homogeneous time to space, 12 severance between superficial and deep-seated states, 13, 14 a posteriori grounds for severance, 14-16 symbolical thinking, 18 number in relation to space, 21 break with solidarity of duration, 16-19. THE SUPERFICIAL EGO ..... 19-24 An illusion, 19, 20 knowledge of things as made and as in the making, 22-24 surrender of superficial states to determinism, 24. INTENSITY OF STATES . . . . . .26 Has no bearing on problem of freedom, 26. DETERMINISM ....... 27-40 A priori and a posteriori , 27. vii viii CONTENTS PACKS PHYSICAL DETERMINISM 28-32 Bergsons two objections to, 29-31 conservation of energy, 31-32 physical determinism reducible to psychological, 32. PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM .... 33-40 Can effect precede cause 33-36 willing for willings sake no analogy, 36-38 impersonal states 39 double inconsistency in surrendering superficial states to deter minism, and an unwitting confession that growing Ego cannot be bearer of free volition and sense of personal identity, 39, 40. A STRANGE DUALISM 41 A TANGLE OF CONTRADICTIONS ... 42, 43 METAPHYSICAL FORM OF CAUSALITY IGNORED . . 43 Ego noumenal or epiphenomenal Some questions unanswered, 45-47. CHAPTER II. MATTER AND MEMORY UNIVERSE AS TOTALITY OF IMAGES .... 49 Perception cannot be function of molecular movements in brain, 50-53 same images in two distinct systems, 51 a fortunate adaptation, 53 question as to function of per ception, 53, 54 a. materialistic tendency, 55. PURE PERCEPTION 55-63 En droit, not en fait y 56, 57 necessary for theory, 57 presence becomes representation, 58 a hypothetical mechanical process, 58-59 the solidary whole 59-63, CONCRETE PERCEPTION 63-68 Pure perception, sensation, and memories, 63 incoherent statements about sensation, 63-65 theory in as great difficulty as realism, 66-68. MEMORY 69-75 Two forms, motor and spontaneous, 69-72 motor memory on police duty, 73, 74 voluntary mode of setting up motor mechanism superfluous, 74-75 automatism at basis of spontaneous memory, 7 1 . CONTENTS ix PACKS RECOGNITION 76-80 Two forms of, automatic and attentive, 76 not accounted for by association of memory with perception, 77 attentive recognition, 78, 79 if consciousness destined for action, brain seems seat of memory in any practical sense, 80. RECONSTRUCTION OF PERCEPTION . . . 81-85 Distinct perception, 83-85. THE UNCONSCIOUS 85-88 Origin of belief in permanence of material reality, 86 seat of pure memory, 87-88. DIFFERENCE ONE OF DEGREE AND NOT OF KIND BETWEEN MENTAL AND PHYSICAL 90, 91 AUTHORS SERVICES TO EPIPHENOMENALISM . 91-105 CRITICAL SUMMARY 106-112 CHAPTER III. CREATIVE EVOLUTION SPIRITUALITY AND SPATIALITY THE Two IDEAL LIMITS 115 TIME IN ABSTRACTION FROM UNIVERSAL INTER ACTION A FORM VOID OF CONTENT . ... --This text refers to the Paperback edition.